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Nick Bostrom is a philosopher at University of Oxford and the director of the Future of Humanity Institute. He has worked on fascinating and important ideas in existential risks, simulation hypothesis, human enhancement ethics, and the risks of superintelligent AI systems, including in his book Superintelligence. I can see talking to Nick multiple times on this podcast, many hours each time, but we have to start somewhere.

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I mean, in philosophy, there's this experience machine, thought experiment.

So Robert Nozick had this thought experiment where you imagine some crazy, super duper neuroscientist of the future have created a machine that could give you any experience you want if you step in there.

And for the rest of your life, you can kind of pre-programmed it in different ways.

You could, whatever you dream, you want to be a great artist, a great lover, have a wonderful life.

All of these things, if you step into the experience machine, will be your experiences.

Constantly happy, But you would disconnect from the rest of reality and you would float there in a tank.

And so Nozick thought that most people would choose not to enter the experience machine.

Many might want to go there for a holiday, but they wouldn't want to check out of existence permanently.

And so he thought that was an argument against certain views of value, according to what we value is a function of what we experience.

Because in the experience machine, you can have any experience you want, and yet many people would think that would not be much value.

So therefore, what we value depends on other things than what we experience.

I mean, what about the fact that maybe what we value is the up and down of life?

So, you could have up and downs in the experience machine, right?

But what can't you have in the experience machine?

Well, I mean, that then becomes an interesting question to explore, But for example, real connection with other people, if the experience machine is a solo machine where it's only you, that's something you wouldn't have there.

You would have this subjective experience that would be like fake people.

But if you gave somebody flowers, that wouldn't be anybody there who actually got happy.

It would just be a little simulation of somebody smiling, but the simulation would not be the kind of simulation I'm talking about in the simulation argument where the simulated creature is conscious.

It would just be a kind of a smiley face that would look perfectly real to you.

So we're now drawing a distinction between appear to be perfectly real and actually being real.

I mean, like a big impact on history, maybe it's also something you won't have if you check into this experience machine.

So some people might actually feel the life I want to have for me is 1 where I have a big positive impact on how history unfolds.

So you could kind of explore these different possible explanations for why it is you wouldn't want to go into the experience machine, if that's what you feel.

And 1 interesting observation regarding this Nozick thought experiment and the conclusions he wanted to draw from it is how much is a status quo effect.

So a lot of people might not want to jettison current reality to plug into this dream machine.

But if they instead were told, well, what you've experienced up to this point was a dream.

Now, do you wanna disconnect from this and enter the real world?

When you have no idea maybe what the real world is.

Or maybe you could say, well, you're actually a farmer in Peru, growing peanuts and you could live for the rest of your life in this.

Or would you want to continue your dream life as Alex Friedman, going around the world, making podcasts and doing research?

If the status quo was that they were actually in the experience machine, I think a lot of people might then prefer to live the life that they are familiar with rather than sort of bail out into.

That's interesting, the change itself, the leap, whatever.

Yeah, so it might not be so much the reality itself that we are after, but it's more that we are maybe involved in certain projects and relationships.

And we have a self-identity and these things that our values are kind of connected with carrying that forward.

And then whether it's inside a tank or outside a tank in Peru, or whether inside a computer or outside a computer, that's kind of less important to what we ultimately care about.

Yeah, but still, so just to linger on it, it is interesting.

I find maybe people are different, but I find myself quite willing to take the leap to the farmer in Peru, especially as the virtual reality system become more realistic.

I find that possibility, and I think more people would take that leap.

But so in this thought experiment, just to make sure we are on the same, so in this case, the farmer in Peru would not be a virtual reality.

The real, your life, like before this whole experience machine started.

Well, I kind of assume from that description, you're being very specific, but that kind of idea just like washes away the concept of what's real.

I mean, I'm still a little hesitant about your kind of distinction between real and illusion, Because when you can have an illusion that feels, I mean, that looks real, I don't know how you can definitively say something is real or not.

Like what's a good way to prove that something is real in that context?

Well, so I guess in this case, it's more a stipulation.

In 1 case, you're floating in a tank with these wires by the super duper neuroscientists plugging into your head, giving you like Friedman experiences.

And in the other, you're actually tilling the soil in Peru, growing peanuts and then those peanuts are being eaten by other people around the world who buy the exports.

And so these are 2 different possible situations in the 1 and the same real world that you could choose to occupy.

But just to be clear, when you're in a vat with wires and the neuroscientists, you can still go farming in Peru, right?

if you wanted to, you could have the experience of farming in Peru, but

that wouldn't actually be any peanuts grown.

So, so a peanut could be grown and you could feed things with that peanut.

And why can't all of that be done in a simulation?

I hope, first of all, that they actually have peanut farms in Peru.

I guess we'll get a lot of comments otherwise from Angry.

I was with you up to the point when you started talking about...

No, I mean, I think, I mean, in the simulation, I think there is a sense, the important sense in which it would all be real.

Nevertheless, there is a distinction between inside assimilation and outside assimilation, or in the case of NOSIG's thought experiment, whether you're in the VAT or outside the VAT.

And some of those differences may or may not be important.

I mean, that comes down to your values and preferences.

So if the experience machine only gives you the experience of growing peanuts, but you're the only 1 in the experience machines.

No, but there's other you can within the experience machine.

Well, there are versions of the experience machine.

So in fact, you might want to have distinguished different thought experiments, different versions of it.

So in like In the original thought experiment, maybe it's only you, right?

And you think, I wouldn't want to go in there.

Well, that tells you something interesting about what you value and what you care about.

Then you could say, well, what if you add the fact that there would be other people in there and you would interact with them?

Well, it starts to make it more attractive, right?

Then you could add in, well, what if you could also have important long-term effects on human history and the world, and you could actually do something useful even though you were in there?

That makes it maybe even more attractive.

Like, you could actually have a life that had a purpose and consequences.

And so as you sort of add more into it, it becomes more similar to the baseline reality that you were comparing it to.

Yeah, but I just think inside the experience machine and without taking those steps you just mentioned, you still have an impact on long-term history of the creatures that live inside that, of the quote-unquote fake creatures that live inside that experience machine.

And that, like at a certain point, if there's a person waiting for you inside that experience machine, maybe your newly found wife, and she dies, she has fear, she has hopes, and she exists in that machine.

When you unplug yourself and plug back in, she's still there, going on about her life.

Well, in that case, yeah, she starts to have more of an independent existence.

But it depends, I think, on how she's implemented in the experience machine.

Take 1 limit case where all she is is a static picture on the wall, a photograph.

So you think, Well, I can look at her, right?

Then you think, well, it doesn't really matter much what happens to that.

Any more than a normal photograph, if you tear it up, right?

It means you can't see it anymore, but you haven't harmed the person whose picture you tore up.

But if she's actually implemented, say, at a neural level of detail, so that she's a fully realized digital mind with the same behavioral repertoire as you have, then very possibly she would be a conscious person like you are.

And then what you do in this experience machine would have real consequences for how this other mind felt.

So you have to specify which of these experience machines you're talking about.

I think it's not entirely obvious that it would be possible to have an experience machine that gave you a normal set of human experiences, which include experiences of interacting with other people, without that also generating consciousnesses corresponding to those other people.

That is, if you create another entity that you perceive and interact with, that to you looks entirely realistic.

Not just when you say hello, they say hello back, but you have a rich interaction, many days, deep conversations.

Like it might be that the only possible way of implementing that would be 1 that also has a side effect, instantiated this other person in enough detail that you would have a second consciousness there.

So you don't think it's possible to fake consciousness and fake intelligence?

I mean, I think you can certainly fake...

If you have a very limited interaction with somebody, you could certainly fake that.

That is, if all you have to go on is somebody said hello to you, that's not enough for you to tell whether that was a real person there or a pre-recorded message or, you know, like a very superficial simulation that has no consciousness.

We could already fake it now, you can record a voice recording and, you know.

But if you have a richer set of interactions where you're allowed to answer, ask open-ended questions and probe from different angles, that couldn't sort of be, you couldn't give canned answer to all of the possible ways that you could probe it, then it starts to become more plausible that the only way to realize this thing in such a way that you would get the right answer from any which angle you probed it would be a way of instantiating it where


Speaker 0: I mean, in philosophy, there's this experience machine, thought experiment. Have you come across this? So Robert Nozick had this thought experiment where you imagine some crazy, super duper neuroscientist of the future have created a machine that could give you any experience you want if you step in there. And for the rest of your life, you can kind of pre-programmed it in different ways. So your Fondest dreams could come true.

You could, whatever you dream, you want to be a great artist, a great lover, have a wonderful life. All of these things, if you step into the experience machine, will be your experiences. Constantly happy, But you would disconnect from the rest of reality and you would float there in a tank. And so Nozick thought that most people would choose not to enter the experience machine. Many might want to go there for a holiday, but they wouldn't want to check out of existence permanently.

And so he thought that was an argument against certain views of value, according to what we value is a function of what we experience. Because in the experience machine, you can have any experience you want, and yet many people would think that would not be much value. So therefore, what we value depends on other things than what we experience. So, okay, can you

Speaker 1: take that argument further? I mean, what about the fact that maybe what we value is the up and down of life?

Speaker 0: So, you could have up and downs in the experience machine, right? But what can't you have in the experience machine? Well, I mean, that then becomes an interesting question to explore, But for example, real connection with other people, if the experience machine is a solo machine where it's only you, that's something you wouldn't have there. You would have this subjective experience that would be like fake people. But if you gave somebody flowers, that wouldn't be anybody there who actually got happy.

It would just be a little simulation of somebody smiling, but the simulation would not be the kind of simulation I'm talking about in the simulation argument where the simulated creature is conscious. It would just be a kind of a smiley face that would look perfectly real to you.

Speaker 1: So we're now drawing a distinction between appear to be perfectly real and actually being real.

Speaker 0: Yeah. So that could be 1 thing. I mean, like a big impact on history, maybe it's also something you won't have if you check into this experience machine. So some people might actually feel the life I want to have for me is 1 where I have a big positive impact on how history unfolds. So you could kind of explore these different possible explanations for why it is you wouldn't want to go into the experience machine, if that's what you feel.

And 1 interesting observation regarding this Nozick thought experiment and the conclusions he wanted to draw from it is how much is a status quo effect. So a lot of people might not want to jettison current reality to plug into this dream machine. But if they instead were told, well, what you've experienced up to this point was a dream. Now, do you wanna disconnect from this and enter the real world? When you have no idea maybe what the real world is.

Or maybe you could say, well, you're actually a farmer in Peru, growing peanuts and you could live for the rest of your life in this. Or would you want to continue your dream life as Alex Friedman, going around the world, making podcasts and doing research? If the status quo was that they were actually in the experience machine, I think a lot of people might then prefer to live the life that they are familiar with rather than sort of bail out into. So.

Speaker 1: That's interesting, the change itself, the leap, whatever.

Speaker 0: Yeah, so it might not be so much the reality itself that we are after, but it's more that we are maybe involved in certain projects and relationships. And we have a self-identity and these things that our values are kind of connected with carrying that forward. And then whether it's inside a tank or outside a tank in Peru, or whether inside a computer or outside a computer, that's kind of less important to what we ultimately care about.

Speaker 1: Yeah, but still, so just to linger on it, it is interesting. I find maybe people are different, but I find myself quite willing to take the leap to the farmer in Peru, especially as the virtual reality system become more realistic. I find that possibility, and I think more people would take that leap.

Speaker 0: But so in this thought experiment, just to make sure we are on the same, so in this case, the farmer in Peru would not be a virtual reality. That would be the real. The real. The real, your life, like before this whole experience machine started.

Speaker 1: Well, I kind of assume from that description, you're being very specific, but that kind of idea just like washes away the concept of what's real. I mean, I'm still a little hesitant about your kind of distinction between real and illusion, Because when you can have an illusion that feels, I mean, that looks real, I don't know how you can definitively say something is real or not. Like what's a good way to prove that something is real in that context?

Speaker 0: Well, so I guess in this case, it's more a stipulation. In 1 case, you're floating in a tank with these wires by the super duper neuroscientists plugging into your head, giving you like Friedman experiences. And in the other, you're actually tilling the soil in Peru, growing peanuts and then those peanuts are being eaten by other people around the world who buy the exports. And so these are 2 different possible situations in the 1 and the same real world that you could choose to occupy.

Speaker 1: But just to be clear, when you're in a vat with wires and the neuroscientists, you can still go farming in Peru, right? No, well,

Speaker 0: if you wanted to, you could have the experience of farming in Peru, but

Speaker 1: that wouldn't actually be any peanuts grown. Well, but what makes a peanut? So, so a peanut could be grown and you could feed things with that peanut. And why can't all of that be done in a simulation?

Speaker 0: I hope, first of all, that they actually have peanut farms in Peru. I guess we'll get a lot of comments otherwise from Angry. I was with you up to the point when you started talking about... You should know you can't grow peanuts

Speaker 1: in that climate.

Speaker 0: No, I mean, I think, I mean, in the simulation, I think there is a sense, the important sense in which it would all be real. Nevertheless, there is a distinction between inside assimilation and outside assimilation, or in the case of NOSIG's thought experiment, whether you're in the VAT or outside the VAT. And some of those differences may or may not be important. I mean, that comes down to your values and preferences. So if the experience machine only gives you the experience of growing peanuts, but you're the only 1 in the experience machines.

Speaker 1: No, but there's other you can within the experience machine. Others can plug in.

Speaker 0: Well, there are versions of the experience machine. So in fact, you might want to have distinguished different thought experiments, different versions of it. So in like In the original thought experiment, maybe it's only you, right? Just you. And you think, I wouldn't want to go in there.

Well, that tells you something interesting about what you value and what you care about. Then you could say, well, what if you add the fact that there would be other people in there and you would interact with them? Well, it starts to make it more attractive, right? Then you could add in, well, what if you could also have important long-term effects on human history and the world, and you could actually do something useful even though you were in there? That makes it maybe even more attractive.

Like, you could actually have a life that had a purpose and consequences. And so as you sort of add more into it, it becomes more similar to the baseline reality that you were comparing it to.

Speaker 1: Yeah, but I just think inside the experience machine and without taking those steps you just mentioned, you still have an impact on long-term history of the creatures that live inside that, of the quote-unquote fake creatures that live inside that experience machine. And that, like at a certain point, if there's a person waiting for you inside that experience machine, maybe your newly found wife, and she dies, she has fear, she has hopes, and she exists in that machine. When you unplug yourself and plug back in, she's still there, going on about her life.

Speaker 0: Well, in that case, yeah, she starts to have more of an independent existence.

Speaker 1: Independent existence.

Speaker 0: But it depends, I think, on how she's implemented in the experience machine. Take 1 limit case where all she is is a static picture on the wall, a photograph. So you think, Well, I can look at her, right? But that's it. Then you think, well, it doesn't really matter much what happens to that.

Any more than a normal photograph, if you tear it up, right? It means you can't see it anymore, but you haven't harmed the person whose picture you tore up. It's a good 1. But if she's actually implemented, say, at a neural level of detail, so that she's a fully realized digital mind with the same behavioral repertoire as you have, then very possibly she would be a conscious person like you are. And then what you do in this experience machine would have real consequences for how this other mind felt.

So you have to specify which of these experience machines you're talking about. I think it's not entirely obvious that it would be possible to have an experience machine that gave you a normal set of human experiences, which include experiences of interacting with other people, without that also generating consciousnesses corresponding to those other people. That is, if you create another entity that you perceive and interact with, that to you looks entirely realistic. Not just when you say hello, they say hello back, but you have a rich interaction, many days, deep conversations. Like it might be that the only possible way of implementing that would be 1 that also has a side effect, instantiated this other person in enough detail that you would have a second consciousness there.

I think that's to some extent

Speaker 1: an open question. So you don't think it's possible to fake consciousness and fake intelligence? Well, it

Speaker 0: might be. I mean, I think you can certainly fake... If you have a very limited interaction with somebody, you could certainly fake that. That is, if all you have to go on is somebody said hello to you, that's not enough for you to tell whether that was a real person there or a pre-recorded message or, you know, like a very superficial simulation that has no consciousness. Because that's something easy to fake.

We could already fake it now, you can record a voice recording and, you know. But if you have a richer set of interactions where you're allowed to answer, ask open-ended questions and probe from different angles, that couldn't sort of be, you couldn't give canned answer to all of the possible ways that you could probe it, then it starts to become more plausible that the only way to realize this thing in such a way that you would get the right answer from any which angle you probed it would be a way of instantiating it where

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Nick Bostrom: Experience Machine | AI Podcast Clips